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Abstract 
The degree to which prevailing land tenure arrangements in sub-Saharan Africa con- 
strain efficiency and agricultural productivity are still not determined. This paper 
examines the sources of economic efficiency (inefficiency) of alternative land tenure 
arrangements in Ethiopia using stochastic frontier production function. The results 
show that sharecropped and borrowed land are technically less efficient than owner- 
cultivated or fixed rental land due to restrictions imposed on them by landowners and 
the interactions of land market with other imperfect and absent input markets. Thus, a 
policy has to be drawn to facilitate more efficient transactions of land between farmers 
and to minimise inefficiencies associated with these tenure systems. 
vi 
Summary 
The effect of alternative land tenure arrangement on agricultural productivity is still not 
determined. While some researchers (e.g. Hayami and Otsuka 1993) argue that tenancy 
arrangements such as sharecropping result in inefficient allocation of resources, others 
(e.g. Cohen 1980; Boserup 1981; Place and Hazell 1993) contend that various factors 
other than the system of land tenure are important determinants of agricultural pro- 
ductivity. Hence, whether or not alternative tenure arrangements constrain agricultural 
productivity remains an empirical question, which depends on the specific economic 
and policy environments under which farm households operate. 
This paper attempts to investigate the technical efficiency of alternative land tenure 
arrangements in Ethiopia, a country where land markets and land policy are critical 
issues for agricultural development due to the high pressure on land. Prior to 1974, land 
tenure in Ethiopia was predominantly based on a feudal system. Where land is privately 
owned, of which the majority was in the hands of the nobility and the church. After the 
revolution of 1974, land was nationalised, declared collective property of the people and 
distributed to tillers. Land transaction was banned and all forms of tenancy relationships 
were prohibited. Since 1991, land lease has been allowed, but rural land still remains 
state property. Différent forms of tenancy (sharecropping, fixed rental, and borrowed/ 
gifted) are now being practised throughout the country, providing an ideal context to 
study the efficiency of alternative tenure arrangements. 
Results are based on data generated through a survey of 161 households operating 
477 plots in the Arsi zone of Oromiya Region in 1994. While 115 households had of 
their own land (received land from the government through redistribution), the test 
were operating leased land. Data were collected on inputs and output, plot charac- 
teristics, wealth status and demographic characteristics of the household as well as input 
and output prices. 
The average value of output per hectare was Ethiopian Birr 2478 (about US$ 310), 
and the highest return was obtained from owner-operated land. Average returns from 
gift plots were significantly lower than those from owned and rented plots. Average re- 
turns from sharecropped plots and gift plots were not significantly différent from each 
other. 
Plots under the différent tenure forms received significantly différent amounts of 
planting and weeding labour, whereas rented and sharecropped plots received less than 
half of the labour input on owner operated plots. However, the use of seed, inorganic 
fertiliser and herbicides did not change with variations in land tenure systems. There was 
no significant différence in land quality by tenure. Rented and sharecropped plots are 
mainly planted with wheat, a principal cereal crop in the area. 
Farmers covered by the study have attained a 71% efficiency rate on average; indicat- 
ing that an improvement in the technical efficiency of farmers can result in an increase 
in crop income of 30%. We thus find that the type of land tenure affects the technical 
efficiency of agriculture significantly. Sharecropped, and gifted/borrowed plots are sig- 
nificantly less efficient than owner-operated plots. However, there was no significant 
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différence in efficiency between owner-operated and fixed rental plots. Moreover, there 
was no significant différence in efficiency between sharecropped and fixed rental, and 
between sharecropped and gifted/borrowed plots. Fixed rental plots were more efficient 
than gifted/borrowed plots. 
viii 
1 Introduction 
In most of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), agricultural land is the fundamental base of liveli- 
hood for the rural population. Due to its economic importance, land markets and land 
tenure security issues in SSA have received considerable public attention. Most of the 
debate centres on the effect of indigenous land rights on land productivity, resource allo- 
cation and investment demand (Dorner 1977; Harrison 1987; Place and Hazell 1993; 
Besley 1995; Gavian and Fafchamps 1996; Sjaastad and Bromley 1997). While some 
argue that indigenous land rights lead to inefficient resource allocation justifying govern- 
ments intervention in land administration to remove the associated inefficiencies 
(Johnson 1972; World Bank 1974; Dorner 1977); others have challenged this view 
(Bales 1986; Besley 1995); others argue that inefficiencies arise because indigenous land 
rights are ambiguous, communal, and afforded insufficient legal protection, resulting in 
tenure insecurity (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997). Furthermore, others such as Cohen 
(1980) and Boserup (1981) argue that indigenous tenure arrangements are dynamic and 
evolve in response to factor price changes. 
While the analytical focus has been on indigenous land rights, communal control 
under these systems is diminishing and African tenure systems are evolving towards 
individualisation of land rights in response to population pressure, agricultural commer- 
cialisation, changing political structure and technological changes (Migot-Adholla et al. 
1991). Despite the considerable analysis of indigenous land rights in African agriculture, 
the efficiency of these evolving land rights and land markets have received little 
attention. 
Evidences from différent parts of Africa confirm instances of privatisation of land 
rights (Migot-Adholla et al. 1991). In Ethiopia, contracts between farmers who received 
government-allocated land and landless tenants including sharecropping, fixed rentals, 
lending and gifting dominate the current land market. Ethiopia presents an ideal context 
for studying both the evolution of land tenure institutions and their impact on technical 
efficiency. Elements of the traditional systems of land tenure, dramatically affected by 
the 1975 land reform measures, appear to be re-emerging. In particular, land leases and 
sharecropping that existed before 1975 dominate the current land market. Land market 
and land policy continue to be critical issues for the Ethiopian development strategy 
given the high pressure on land by a predominantly agricultural population. An import- 
ant policy issue is whethei the government intervenes in land market through redistri- 
bution and restriction of land transactions. Moreover, the land market in Ethiopia is 
dominated by evolving institutions in the form of land contracts, so that the analysis of 
the efficiency of these evolving institutions provides significant guidance for effective 
policy formulation. This paper analyses the development of land markets and the ef- 
ficiency of current land contracts and its implications on land policy in Ethiopia. 
In the analysis of land market evolution, we examine the impact of political changes 
and other economic and institutional factors on existing land tenure arrangements. We 
argue that the evolution of these institutions is a result of the combination of political 
economy, government intervention in land and rural labour markets, and population 
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pressure. For example, the sharecropping system has its roots in the land tenure system 
of feudal Ethiopia, while land lending and gifting re-emerged when land and farm 
labour transactions were prohibited during the socialist system of public ownership. 
The efficiency of the current land tenure arrangements is then examined using a 
stochastic frontier production function. It is hypothesised that the différent types of land 
contracts vary substantially in their technical efficiency, which refers to the ability of the 
farmer to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs on a given plot of land, 
controlling for other factors that affect input use and productivity. It is argued here that 
unobservable component of inputs (e.g. effort in the case of labour, that will differ on 
contracted plots), and différences in such unobservable inputs lead to différences in 
technical inefficiency. If the hypothesis is true, given the notion that land contracts are 
evolving, land policy should be directed towards encouraging the more efficient land 
transactions. 
The next section of this paper reviews the theoretical literature on tenancy contracts, 
efficiency and imperfect factor markets. The evolution of land contracts in Ethiopia is 
analysed in Section 3. In Section 4, the land tenure survey conducted in the Arsi zone is 
described and then the current land tenure arrangements are examined. This is followed 
by examining the efficiency of current land contractual forms in Section 5, using data 
from the Arsi survey. Here, the analytical and empirical framework of the efficiency of 
the prevailing land contracts are first described and then the results of the econometric 
analysis are presented. Conclusions and policy implications are presented in Section 6. 
2 Tenancy contracts, efficiency 
and imperfect factor markets 
Despite the large body of literature on tenancy contracts and agrarian organisations 
(Otsuka and Hayami 1988; Singh 1989; Otsuka et al. 1992), the rationale and relative 
efficiency of agricultural land contracts is still much debated. In an extensive review, 
Otsuka et al. (1992) claim that the reason behind the theoretical confusion and 
inconciusive empirical results is the separate analysis of land and labour contracts. 
Accordingly, land tenancy, labour employment and owner cultivation need to be 
considered together. 
Underlying the efficiency of alternative land lease contracta is the incentive system 
that each contract system provides to the contract holder. Under the assumptions of 
perfect markets and no risk, an efficient incentive system requires that the contract 
holder be the residual claimant to the output (Varian 1993). Such an arrangement 
would induce the contract holder to produce the optimal level of output where the 
marginal product of the worker's extra effort equals the marginal cost of putting that 
effort. Given these assumptions, owner-cultivated and fixed-rental tenancy should thus 
result in an efficient resource allocation. 
Following the assumptions of perfect market and no risk, Mill (1848) and Marshal 
(1890) and numerous others have concluded that share-tenancy results in an inefficient 
resource allocation, since the share tenant receives, as marginal revenue, only a fraction 
of the value of his or her marginal product of labour, thus limiting the tenant's incentive 
to supply labour or other inputs at the optimum level. On the other hand, Johnson 
(1950) and Cheung (1969) have argued that if effort is costlessly enforceable, share- 
cropping arrangement can be as efficient as owner-cultivated and fixed-rent tenancy. 
However, whether costs of monitoring and enforcement are low enough to result in 
efficient sharecropping remains an empirical question. The tenant's labour input may 
not be fully observable due to the spatial nature of agricultural production, i.e. the 
landowner may not be able to ascertain whether a low yield in the tenant field was due 
to low labour input, unfavourable weather conditions or any other stochastic factors. 
Risk and market imperfections can be important in the agriculture of developing 
countries. Tenancy may not at all be necessary if there are no market imperfections other 
than imperfect land markets (Pender and Fafchamps 2001). If markets for all factors 
other than land are perfect, landowners can rely on those markets to allocate resources 
optimally. In the presence of production risk and missing insurance markets, risk pool- 
ing may be an important consideration in tenancy contracts. Cheung (1969) thus argues 
that risk pooling may be the motive for sharecropping. 
Asymmetric assumptions about the enforceability of land and labour contracts have 
created considerable confusion in the literature on agrarian institutions (Otsuka et al. 
1992). If tenants have less work incentive under sharecropping than under fixed rental, 
because the share tenant claims only a fraction of his/her marginal product, it follows 
that labour hired under fixed wage rate should even have weaker work incentives, and 
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enforcement of their work effort should be more costly than in the case of share tenancy. 
In line with this, another argument for the existence of sharecropping is the difficulty of 
monitoring labour effort. Stiglitz (1974) argues that if labour effort is unobservable, 
sharecropping may dominate wage labour due to its incentive advantages, and fixed- 
rental because of its risk pooling advantage. 
There have been several attempts to establish a rationale for the existence of share- 
cropping arrangements under certainty. For example, self-selection model developed by 
Hallagan (1978) considers share tenancy as one of the land contract arrangements from 
which tenants can choose to best utilise their entrepreneurial ability. Otsuka and 
Hayami (1988), however, show that when the landlord's optimisation behaviour is 
neglected (i.e. when there is no information about the tenant's work ability), then either 
the fixed-rent contract or wage employment will be chosen. On the other hand, if the 
landlord's optimisation behaviour is incorporated and the amount of land is sufficiently 
restricted, as done by Allen (1985), then both share and fixed-rent tenancy can achieve 
similar resource allocations. 
However, Otsuka and Hayami (1988) argue that even in the case of enforceable 
contracts under certainty, there is no positive reason for sharecropping arrangement to 
exist if the optimisation behaviours of both the tenant and landlord are considered, 
since an infinite number of optimum combinations of share and fixed rents exists, with 
no single combination being preferred to the other. Under the condition of uncertainty, 
however, the existence of sharecropping arrangements can be justified based on its role 
in risk sharing, with or without enforceable contract as long as both tenant and landlord 
are risk averse. 
Available evidence, mostly from studies conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s in 
South and South-East Asia, on the efficiency of alternative land tenure contracts, Otsuka 
and Hayami (1988) do not find significant inefficiency of share tenancy reported by most 
of those studies. However, they argue that lack of significant inefficiency may not mean 
that there is no problem of contract enforcement but rather sharecropping is adopted 
where the làndlord's cost of enforcing the tenant's work effort is less. Otherwise, land- 
lords with relatively high enforcement costs would prefer fixed-rent contracts even at the 
expense of a reduced rent that compensates tenants for greater exposure to risk. There. 
fore, in the absence of institutional restrictions on the scope of contract choice and 
assuming that landlords select contracts on the basis of their comparative advantage in 
monitoring tenants' work effort, there should be no significant inefficiency associated 
with share tenancy, compared to other tenancy forms (Otsuka et al. 1992). However, as 
it is difficult to assess the enforceability of the contract, the relative efficiency of the land 
contracts, for example owner-operated versus fixed rented or sharecropped tenures, 
becomes an empirical issue, while controlling for other factors that affect input use and 
productivity (e.g. land quality and farmer's ability). A recent study by Gavian and Ehui 
(1998) found that total factor productivity was lower on contracted land (either cash 
rented, sharecropped, gifted or borrowed) than owner-operated land, although the 
différences could not be attributed to différences in inputs. 
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3 Evolution of land market in Ethiopia 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, three land tenure regimes have existed 
under three distinct political regimes. These were: (1) the feudal system of the pre-1975 
period; (2) the state ownership of the socialist system in the 1975-91 period; and (3) the 
semi-liberal and market-oriented system since 1991. Even though land tenure insti- 
tutions continuously evolved in response to the political environment, rural demo- 
graphic dynamics, expansion of markets, natural resource conditions (particularly soil 
erosion), and social and physical infrastructures, these three periods marked important 
pivotal points in the development of the prevailing land tenure system in the country. 
Thus, the process of the evolution of land contracts is better understood when it is 
analysed in light of the land tenure systems during these three periods. 
3.1 The pre-1 975 period 
The land tenure system in pre-1975 Ethiopia was one of the most complex and intricate 
systems. It represented the issue of power and governance in Ethiopia, as land was the 
major source of income and livelihood in this predominantly agrarian economy. The 
land tenure system varied from region to region due to the diverse geographical and 
cultural settings and the différent socio-political events that occurred in différent parts of 
the country. These different land tenure arrangements, in general, can be categorised 
into usufructuary tenures and private tenures (Dessalegn 1984). The usufructuary tenure 
systems include the rist, semon and maderia or yemengist forms that differ principally in the 
type of institution holding the ultimate reversionary rights over the land. 
The rist system was one of the oldest and most common forms of usufructuary ten- 
ures that characterised the land tenure system of northern Ethiopia where the com- 
munity held the ultimate reversionary rights over land. Rist was a right, which a holder 
could claim a portion of lands from his or her ancestors who originally held the land. 
Village chiefs, who were usually appointed by the district's governors, administered the 
rist related land rights. These hereditary rights were subject to payment of taxes and pro- 
vision of other services to the local administration or gult (Hoben 1973). Holders of the 
rist could bequeath their holdings but could not sell, mortgage or exchange it in any 
form. This land tenure system featured communal characteristics and provided some- 
what an assured access to land to all members of the rist. The security of individual hold- 
ings was also protected in this system through honouring of hereditary rights and deny- 
ing access to `outsiders'. Nevertheless, the possibility of a claim at any time to a part of 
the land that was protected by rist subjected rist holders to varying degrees of insecurity. 
Farmers used to spend significant time in land-related court cases, sometimes even 
between close relatives (Hoben 1973). 
With respect to access to land, this type of usufructuary tenure system is very similar 
to other indigenous tenure systems of sub-Saharan Africa. The main différence lies in 
the way rights are traced. Unlike other hereditary rights that are either matrilineal or 
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patrilineal, rist rights could be traced through any relative, even through one's spouse 
(Hoben 1973). Therefore, a person could potentially claim rist rights to a host of land 
tracts than the person actually fawned and/or farmed. Consequently, the numerous 
claims of rist rights and subsequent litigation over land parcels severely diminished 
security and incentives to invest in farmland. Furthermore, the tradition of subdivision 
of holdings to heirs led to a continuing fragmentation of holdings in the densely 
populated northern highlands of Ethiopia. 
The semon, a system where the church held the primary reversionary rights, arose 
when the Crown granted rural land to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church to generate 
financial and material support for its services. The church during this period owned a 
substantial share of tax-free rural lands. As the church itself was not directly involved in 
farming, it leased out its lands to local farmers under sharecropping arrangements and 
collected the rents as well as land taxes (tributes) that would have otherwise gone to the 
government treasury. 
Maderia or yemengist lands were originally unoccupied lands that were declared state 
property, most of which were located in the south. When the imperial government 
conquered the south, south-west and eastern parts of the country, all unoccupied 
(unsettled) rural land were declared state property and given to officiais and loyalists of 
the Crown (Dessalegn 1984). During the military advance by the emperor, militiamen 
were among those who received land in these regions. This constituted what was called 
the gebbar system, which is a form of freehold tenure. Holders of such rights had the 
privilege to transfer the land through sale, mortgage or exchange subject to payment of 
land tax to the government treasury. As most of the lands were granted to the powerful 
officiais and loyalists of the Crown, the local populations in these areas became landless 
and entered into tenancy relationships with landlords. 
All the rist, semon and maderia or yemengist tenures were similar in providing use rights 
to the holder while institutions held the ultimate reversionary rights over individual 
holdings were différent. The nature of tenure arrangement and security of tenure on 
individual holdings was highly dependent on the holder's relationship with the insti- 
tution governing access to land. 
During this period, the prevalence and characteristics of land rental markets was 
dictated by the type of land tenure system as well as by the political environment. The 
traditional rist system in the north reduced the need for land market development 
compared to that in the south where freehold tenure dominated. For example, between 
1967 and 1970, only 7-16% of the rural population were renters in the northern 
provinces as compared to 37-73% in the south (Cohen and Weintraub 1975). The rist 
system, by assuring access to ail members of the community, equalised land endowments 
and so there were very few landless peasants. Landlessness, however, was common 
among traders, potters, weavers, and tanners who were not allowed to own land (Mesfin 
1991), as most of these activities were carried out by immigrants from other places and, 
thus, were considered `outsiders'. Thus, most of the farmers in the north were owner 
cultivators, and tenancy was primarily restricted to those forbidden to own land. Tenants 
who owned land were those with excess labour and oxen and wanted to increase their 
holdings, and sharecropping was the dominant form (Cohen and Weintraub 1975). 
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Most of the landowners were farmers themselves and so their ability to monitor and 
enforce contracts was diminished. Furthermore, failing rains and recurrent drought 
made agriculture a risky enterprise. Because rist land was more likely to be claimed and 
taken away by another person, the farther away one lived from one's land, absentee 
landlordism was virtually non-existent (Hoben 1973). 
In the south, however, land was distributed to only a few people who were allowed to 
buy and sell land. As a result, most of the farmers were tenants, with sharecropping and 
fixed rents being the dominant forms of land contract. Even though absentee land- 
lordism was prevalent, sharecropping was sustained because landlords could hire super- 
visors who lived in the same communities with tenants to enforce the contracta. Even 
without supervision, landlords used threats of eviction and political power to enforce 
contracts, and usually determined the sharecropping arrangement. 
Resource pooling may have played a critical role in the south for the existence of 
sharecropping especially for the less powerful landowners that resided in the same 
community as their tenants and farmed part of their land. Landowners provided credit 
to their tenants (Dessalegn 1984), who supplied their labour and animal power. Fixed 
rents, on the other hand, most likely resulted from absentee landlordism and inability to 
enforce contracts. 
In both the north and south, there existed three major forms of sharecropping 
arrangements classified according to the share of harvest paid to the landowner as rent. 
In siso (one-third) arrangement, the tenant supplied all the inputs, mainly seed, oxen and 
labour, and paid one-third of the harvest to the landowner as rent. Since the tenant paid 
one-tenth of the harvest as land tax, known locally as asrat, before sharing the harvest 
with the landowner, the tenant effectively retained 60% of the harvest. In irbo (one- 
quarter), the rental payment was one-fourth of the harvest after deducting the asrat, and 
so the tenant effectively retained two-thirds of the total harvest. In equl (equal) arrange- 
ments, the landowner sometimes supplied some of the inputs, especially oxen and seed, 
and after paying the asrat, the harvest was divided on a 50:50 basis (Cohen and 
Weintraub 1975). 
Of the three forms of sharecropping arrangements, siso was dominant. A study in 
Arsi, central Ethiopia, indicated that of all the tenancy in the study area, 60% were 
under siso, 30% under equl, and 10% were hired farm labourers (Cohen and Weintraub 
1975). Most of the sharecropping agreements were verbal and the ternis were based on 
customary practices of each area. Upon termination of the agreement, the tenant was 
not compensated for any improvements he or she made on the land (Dessalegn 1984). 
In the early and mid-1960's, the country's economy was heading in a capitalistic 
direction. Financial institutions and industries increased, markets expanded, and 
modern administration systems and physical infrastructure extended into remote parts 
of the country. Land rental markets thrived with the expansion of commercial agricul- 
ture and introduction of mechanisation and modern agricultural inputs since the early 
1960's. These same developments seem to have affected sharecropping arrangements, as 
the improvement in agricultural productivity coupled with population growth raised 
sharecropping rental rates. Irbo arrangement became rare and siso gradually shifted to 
equl (Cohen and Weintraub 1975). 
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With the growing recognition of the land tenure system as a fundamental restraining 
factor to the country's agricultural development effort, and as an underlying cause of 
land degradation and unequal income distribution, the need for land reform became the 
key issue of the time. Scholars, development planners, and policy makers expressed the 
need to institutionalise formal and legal procedures for land markets. The regime's third 
five-year plan emphasised this need and proposed protection of tenants from arbitrary 
eviction, establishment of fixed rent system and ending of sharecropping system, insti- 
tution of land leasing arrangements and compensation of tenants for land improve- 
ments, registration of land rights, and adjudication procedure. Speaking on the occasion 
of the submission of a draft legislation to parliament to reform some features of the land 
tenure system, the Emperor expressed the need to replace the customary land tenure 
system with a modern and formai land tenure institution: 
The intent of the draft legislation is to define the rights, duties and responsibilities of 
tenants and landlords, to ensure a fair and equitable share of returns for both 
parties, to provide the required governmental assistance if and when both parties 
wish to have a written agreement of document specifying their obligation, and to 
provide an incentive for sustained increase in the income of both parties by 
establishing on a legal basis the traditional and customary system (cited in Cohen 
and Weintraub 1975, p. 96). 
3.2 The Derg period (1975-91) 
The landlord-tenant relationship and the rist system continued to be the dominant land 
tenure institution in most parts of the country until the military took over power in 
1974, to begin what is known as the Derg regime. The Derg launched a radical land 
reform programme that covered ail parts of the country. The March 1975 decree ended 
ail forms of customary land tenure and landlordism. All rural lands were declared state 
property and redistributed to the tillers, primarily based on family size and quality of the 
land in an attempt to create equity and fairness in land acquisition. The same decree 
also banned ail kinds of land transactions and wage labour in rural areas to ensure that 
the tillers remained the beneficiaries of the land. Accordingly, farmers could neither sell, 
mortgage, lease out, and transfer the land allocated to them, nor use hired labour. Land 
rental and farm labour markets legally ceased to exist. 
The power and responsibility to allocate and administer land was given to the local 
Peasant Associations (PAs), the lowest administrative unit of the regime. Following this 
major agrarian reform, rural farmlands in Ethiopia have belonged to the 'people' but 
controlled by the government. The only formai way of obtaining access to land was 
through membership in the PA and periodic redistribution of existing crop and pasture 
lands among households based on family size and land quality. Subsequent measures of 
land redistribution, collectivisation, villagisation, and resettlement programmes were 
undertaken. 
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The demand for land by the rapidly growing farmer population in rural areas could 
not be met through land redistribution. Although tenancy and use of hired labour were 
banned by law, farmers gradually started to informally lease out their lands to close 
relatives and friends and temporarily give out part of their holding as gift to their newly 
married relatives, due to population pressure and increasing landlessness.t The practice 
of lending and gifting land, with the freeze on land and rural labour transactions, suggest 
an altruistic motive on the part of landowners to support the incomes of their relatives 
and friends. However, as we shall later see, lending and gifting of land continued even 
when the freeze on land and rural labour transactions were lifted. A rural household 
survey conducted by the Addis Ababa University and the Centre for the Study of African 
Economies in 1994 indicates the existence of such informai land markets during this 
period.z Out of the total of 1281 sampled households that held at least one plot of 
cropland, 27 (2%) of them reported that they had obtained some plots from other 
farmers some time between 1975 and 1990 (Amare 1998). Except for one household 
that held the plot under fixed rental, the other 26 held their plots under sharecropping 
arrangements. One-half of these households were in the Amhara region, where 
sharecropping was an older institution. In Ankober and Debre Berhan (Amhara Region) 
alone, about 7 and 11%, respectively, of the sampled farmers were cultivating at least 
one plot contracted-in during the time qf the survey. Given the short-term nature of 
informai land contracts, other farmers, too, might have imported and used such lands 
and returned it before 1994 when the survey was conducted. Thus, it is likely that the 
number of farmers who participated in such informai land market could be higher than 
the study revealed. 
In 1990, the Derg regime issued the so-called `mixed economic programme' that 
liberalised some of the highly centralised system of economic management. The reform 
conferred a transférable and life-long lease to holders of rural lands. With this reform, 
the ban on temporary land lease was lifted and farmer-to-farmer land contracts became 
official. Thus, the government intervened only to formalise an on-going process. The 
reform, however, did not establish legal procedures and institutional mechanism to 
allow the development of formai land markets. Nevertheless, more and more farmers 
started to engage in various kinds of informai land markets. 
Thus, the land market during this regime continued to evolve. In contrast to the 
sharecropping and fixed-rent arrangements that were dominant under the feudal system, 
lending and gifting were practised as a result of population pressure and increasing 
landlessness. These forms of land transactions implicitly responded to the ban on rural 
1. The practice of land lending and land parcel gift probably existed before the Derg regime as in many other 
African countries as an extremely common form of advanced inheritance. The practice during the Derg 
regime, however, was temporary (e.g. until the next land redistribution) as farmers cannot give away 
government land and perhaps is given for older children and relatives for exchange of labour or oxen 
power. 
2. The survey was conducted through collaboration of the Addis Ababa University (AAU), the Centre for the 
Study of African Economies, Oxford University (CSAE) and the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI). The sample comprised two woredas in Tigray (Geblen and Atsbi), four in Amhara (Debre Berhan, 
Ankober, Bugna and Yetmen), four in Oromiya (Adaa, Korodegaga, Adele Keke and Shashemene) and five 
in Southern regions of Ethiopia (Bule, Boloso, Doma, Indibir and Azedeboa). 
labour market, as lending and gifting of land were associated with the tenant providing 
some of his labour to the landowner's farmland in exchange for land. 
3.3 The post-1991 period 
After the fall of the Derg in May 1991, the new government reaffirmed what the 
previous regime had established by constitutionalising state ownership of all rural lands. 
Article 40(3) of the constitution states that: 
The right of ownership of rural land and urban land, as well as of all natural 
resources, is exclusively vested in the state and the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a 
common property of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia and shall not 
be subject to sale or to other means of transfer. 
The new constitution, which was adopted in 1994, allows temporary leases. The 
constitution guarantees the rights of peasants and pastoralists of free access to land and 
the right of individuals to claim compensation for improvements they make on land 
including the right to bequeath, transfer or remove such improvements when the right 
to use the land expires. Now, farmers have the right to use the land indefinitely, lease it 
out temporarily to other farmers, and transfer it to their children but cannot sell it 
permanently or mortgage it. Although the constitution has resolved some issues, it seems 
to create other ambiguities and does not address some important issues (Fitsum et al. 
1999). For example, given the scarcity of land, it is not clear how peasants' rights of free 
access to land can be assured in practice, and how much land peasants are entitled to. 
Those issues have been left to the regional governments to resolve and there have been 
significant différences across the regions with respect to development of a regional land 
policy. 
In Tigray Region, for example, the land policy issued in 1997 states that there will be 
no further redistribution of land except where major infrastructure investments such as 
irrigation necessitates redistribution. So far, that policy is holding and no redistribution 
of land has taken place in the region since 1991. Consistently, with the constitution and 
practices, the policy also allows leasing of land for up to 10 years if the lessee uses 
`modern technology' and for only two years if the lessee uses `traditional technology'. 
However, the policy fails to define what constitutes modern and traditional technology 
(Fitsum et al. 1999). The regional government in Tigray also issues land registration 
certificates to landholders. The policy also allows for inheritance with some restrictions 
to discourage land fragmentation among family members. 
Some of the issues being considered in Amhara Region are allowing consolidation of 
fields through exchanges and issuing land certificates. While a major land redistribution 
was undertaken in Amhara in 1997 and 1998, there has been none in Oromiya Region 
for more than ten years (Bezuayehu et al. 2000); although no official statement has been 
given by the regional government for abandoning redistribution. In an effort to rehabili- 
tate degraded areas and reduce landlessness, however, the Tigray and Amhara regional 
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governments issued directives in 1999 to distribute wasteland on hillsides to individuals 
and groups for private tree planting and agroforestry (Fitsum et al. 1999; Lakew et al. 
2000). These directives, however, seem to have been prompted by the success of the 
practice in Tigray since 1992 and in the Wello area of Amhara Region since 1997. 
As the constitution permits, short-term leases such as rental and sharecropping are 
practised all over the country, in response to land scarcity in all regions. However, there 
is still no institutional mechanism and legal procedure to protect temporary land 
contracts and arbiter conflicts. Currently, such disputes are handled in a court run by 
peasant associations (PAs). With uncertainties surrounding land ownership, land rental 
and sharecropping arrangements re-emerged as superior forms of land contracts in the 
rural areas besides land lending and gifting, which were the dominant forms of land 
transaction during the Derg regime. 
The next section examines these land contractual forms. Hypotheses and evidence 
about their existence and dominance from différent parts of Ethiopia are compared and 
contrasted, based on data from a survey undertaken by the International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI) in the Arsi zone of Oromiya Region in 1994, in addition to 
other surveys and case studies. Then, in Section 5, the efficiency and determinants of 
inefficiency of the land contract forms are examined, using the stochastic production 
frontier approach and data from the ILRI survey. 
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4 Prevailing land contracts in Arsi 
Data used in this paper is obtained from a survey in Arsi zone of Oromiya Region 
conducted in 1994 to identify factors influencing evolution of land tenure institutions 
and to determine the effects of land tenure on investment, productivity and efficiency in 
crop-livestock systems in the highlands of Ethiopia.3 The study area is one of the most 
productive areas of Ethiopia. Four peasant associations (PAs), the lowest level of admin- 
istration consisting usually of 3-4 villages, were selected for their varying altitudes and, 
thus, mix of crop and livestock activities. A census carried out in 1994 provided a 
sampling framework for classifying households based on their access to state lands. 
Households were classified as either PA members if they have received at least one plôt 
from the government or as landless if they had not acquired either crop or pasture land 
from the government. Out of the total farming population of 1671 households, 83% 
were PA members (Gavian and Ehui 1998). A random sample of 161 households of 
which 115 were PA members was selected from the census list. 
The selected households controlled 477 separate plots, defined as a distinct manage- 
ment unit due to the farmer's choice to plant a specific crop and variety and apply 
specific quantities of production inputs. Plot area was measured. Data on all inputs 
including labour time by source, field operations, amount of animal traction, seeds, 
fertiliser, pesticides and herbicides used were collected from all sampled plots during the 
main 1994 cropping season. Information was collected twice weekly by asking the farmer 
to recall his or her activities on particular plots during the previous three days. 
Quantities of cereals, pulses and residues produced on each plot were weighed after 
threshing and winnowing at the end of the season. 
In a separate survey, the prices of all crops and residues were collected twice per 
month in each of two major rural markets frequently visited by the farmers in the study 
area. Average prices were used to value total output of each plot. In addition, demo- 
graphic data on each sampled household was collected. These include family size, age, 
sex and education of the head of the household, number of ploughing oxen owned, and 
number and types of livestock owned by the household, converted to tropical livestock 
units (TLUs). 
4.1 Common types of land contracts 
The ILRI survey shows that 16% of all cultivated plots were contracted, with 31% being fixed 
rentals, 25% being sharecropped, and the remaining 44% were borrowed or gifted (Table 1). 
This shows the slight dominance of fixed rentals compared to sharecropping. Credit con- 
straint and resource pooling by resource poor farmers appears to be the main motive for 
sharecropping. In contrast to the pre-1975 period of landlord-tenant relationship, share- 
cropping now involves multi way factor exchange between two farmers with différent factor 
3. Highlands are those areas predominantly above 1500 masl. 
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endowments and within the saure social class. This is supported by the increasing con- 
tribution of farm inputs by landowners to tenanted fields. For example, the ILRI survey 
shows that landowners contributed between 2 and 31% of the total oxen draft, fertiliser, 
pesticides and seed inputs on sharecropped fields, while in the AAU/CSAE/IFPRI survey, 
13-40% of tenants responded that their landowners had contributed to supply of seed, oxen, 
fertiliser and labour inputs. Underlying this contribution by landowners is the removal of 
fertiliser and other subsidies, and lack of draft oxen. 
Table 1. Nature of contracts for crop lands in Arsi zone, Ethiopia. 
Contracted 
PA-allocated Rented Shared Borrowed 
Share of contracta for cropped fields (%) 83 5 4 7 
Users 
PA-member households (number) 100 18 76 64 
Landless households (number) 0 83 24 36 
No. of years field used by current farmer 8 2 3 3 
Duration of current contract (%) 
One year 0 91 63 16 
Two years 0 6 7 2 
Three or more years 0 0 7 0 
Permanent/indefinite 100 3 23 81 
Proof of contract (% fields) 
None required 0 27 77 96 
Witnesses required 100 8 0 0 
Written contract 0 65 23 4 
Share of fields for which user holds the 
following right (%): 
Unrestricted crop choice 100 100 100 97 
Fallow for 1 year 96 87 33 16 
Fallow for more than 1 year 95 64 8 13 
Plant trees 92 75 12 19 
lnstall a well or pump 77 75 12 19 
Build stone bunds 79 82 37 35 
Build fence from natural materials 93 89 34 55 
Build fence from stone/metal 79 68 14 32 
Share out 98 64 53 6 
Rentout 97 62 44 6 
Lend out 96 61 45 6 
Bequeath 99 68 34 6 
Notes: Borrowed plot includes gifted. 'Permanent', in the case of duration of current contract, means that the two parties 
will honour the agreement until the government intervenes with another distribution. 
Source:, Gavian and Ehui (1998). 
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Although the traditional sharecropping is evolving towards cost and input sharing as 
shown above, the traditional siso (one-third share of output to landowner) and equl 
(equal share) arrangements are persisting. ILRI's survey in Arsi shows that 61% of 
sharecropped plots were held under equl arrangements and the test under siso. 
Lexander's observation in the same region three decades ago, however, shows the reverse 
with siso arrangements dominating (Lexander 1970). This indicates that land tenure 
institutions are dynamic and respond to changing market, population and technological 
conditions. The resulting dynamics, however, are not uniform in all parts of the country. 
For example, according to the results of the AAU/CSAE/IFPRI survey, equl share- 
cropping is dominant (80-100%) in all the regions except in Amhara, where siso (5 2%) 
is more than equl (32%). The cause for this différence seems to be différences in 
landlessness.4 For example, with the exception of the Amhara Region, the policy of land 
redistribution has not been affected for more than eight years and so landlessness and 
consequent market demand for farmland and rent will tend to be higher. On the other 
hand, in those areas where redistribution has not been carried out for a long time, 
farmers may feel more tenure security and, therefore, more inspired to invest in land 
improvement and soil fertility, which will raise land prices. 
Another reason for the prevalence of equl in comparison to siso arrangement is the 
extent of resource pooling, credit, and risk sharing involved. The ILRI survey shows that 
landowners bear more of the total cost of inputs under the equl arrangement (19-32%) 
than the siso arrangement (4-14%). Inputs shared in equl are mostly fertiliser, pesticides, 
seed and weeding, and harvesting labour. Siso, on the other hand, involved sharing the 
cost of only fertiliser, oxen and seed. On average, sharecropping rents constitute 60% of 
total production costs, and after paying rents in the form of share of output, a siso 
sharecropper gets a net retum of 1012 Ethiopian Birr (EB)5 per hectare or about twice 
the amount received by the equl sharecropper (Gavian and Amare 1996). Thus, despite 
the fact that siso is a more `profitable' rental contract, more farmers are engaged in the 
less profitable equl arrangements. This suggests that farmers are taking advantage of the 
factor exchanges and higher risk sharing or credit involved under the equl arrangement.' 
Under land scarcity conditions, however, landowners may have more control on 
deciding the contractual share. 
Fixed rental is an emerging and growing form of land institution in the highlands. 
According to the ILRI survey in Arsi, rented fields made up 31% of the total area of 
contracted fields (Table 1), but less than 10% according to the AAU/CSAE/IFPRI 
survey. Land rent is ranch lower than the implicit cost of sharecropping. The average 
cost for renting a field in the survey area was EB 352/ha in 1994 (US$ 56/ha) 
compared to EB 935/ha (US$ 148/ha) for sharecropping. This high differential 
4. Besides, différences in the extent of social interactions and transaction costs, productivity of the land, and 
access to credit or savings may also lead to different contract choices. We owe this important point to John 
Pender who reviewed this manuscript. 
5. At the time of the survey, the official exchange rate of US$ 1 was EB 6.329. As at March 2000, the 
exchange rate was US$ 1 = EB 8.13. 
6. The actual relative profitability has to be judged after subtracting the tenant's share of cost of inputs under 
the two alternatives, since the siso sharecropper may contribute more inputs/hectare than the equl 
sharecropper. 
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indicates that the severity of credit and capital constraints (inputs and draft animais) 
among the landless. 
Borrowed and gifted lands are usually given by the landholder to the user `free of 
charge'. Borrowed lands are given for a definite period, whereas gifted fields are usually 
given for a longer, but indefinite period (i.e. commonly until the next land redistri- 
bution). Both types of lands are mostly given by relatives, usually, parents to their 
newly-married family members. As offspring or relatives of the landowner, many of these 
recipient farmers contribute labour to the landowner's fields and so there is an implicit 
cost. Therefore, given these farm labour contributions, the altruistic motive of land- 
owners for giving land to their relatives and friends in order to support their incomes 
during the Derg regime when land and rural labour transactions were prohibited, is 
reduced, if not eliminated. Since these contributions were difficult to monitor and have 
not been valued here, the hypothesis cannot be tested. Borrowed and gift arrangements 
are fairly common, making up 44% of ail contracted plots in the ILRI survey. 
The prevailing three types of land contract (fixed rent, sharecrop, and gift or bor- 
rowing) differ substantially in their duration and the range of rights offered to the tenant 
(Table 1). The contracted fields were originally allocated directly by the government 
through the PA and involve some restrictions such as on growing of trees on usufruct 
rights. Hence, the contract between the PA-landowner and the tenant cannot offer more 
rights to the tenant than those offered by the government. 
Most farmers on PA-allocated fields (or owner cultivators) are able to exercise most of 
the usufruct rights shown in Table 1. About one-fifth of farmers felt they could not build 
wells, stone bunds, or permanent fences of metal or stone. However, these responses 
may reflect more their desire rather than their right, since the distinction between rights 
and desire or practice is difficult to make to farmers, the concept of rights being rather 
abstract. In contrast, farmers on the contracted fields were substantially more restricted 
in ail activities except for the right to choose the crop they plant. Undertaking structural 
changes, fallowing the land, and subcontracting out the land were usually not possible 
for farmers with land contracts. As on ail contracted fields, the range of use and modifi- 
cation rights is more restricted than on PA-allocated fields. However, fixed-fee renters 
have the broadest range of rights among users of contracted fields. They also are the 
most likely to have a written contract. 
Of the contracted fields, fixed rental fields have the shortest leases. Ninety-one 
percent operated under a one-year agreement and was less often extended compared to 
agreements established by borrowers or sharecroppers, as indicated by the number of 
years the field had actually been used. Sharecropped fields are held longer than fixed 
rental fields, with 23% under long-term agreements and an average holding time of three 
years. The reverse is true in terms of rights. The considerably more restricted range of 
rights on sharecropped than fixed-rent fields reflect the lack of autonomy for the 
share-tenant in this partnership. Surprisingly, almost one-half of the sharecroppers 
revealed that they could share out (53%), rent out (44%), or lend out (45%) of their 
plots. This highlights out earlier concern about the difficulty of farmers distinguishing 
rights from desires. On the other hand, since some sharecroppers also owned land, they 
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may have been referring to their rights on their own land rather than the sharecropped 
land. 
The average duration of the borrowed and gifted lands cornes closest of all the land 
contracts to the PA-allocated fields, with 81% of the users operating under an indefinite 
period. Furthermore, the arrangement rarely requires a written contract (Table 1). Even 
though they attract the longest contracts, their range of rights is very restricted, more 
restrictive than rented fields and much more restrictive than PA-allocated fields. 
In the next section, the relative efficiency and determinants of inefficiency of the 
fixed rent, sharecrop, and gift or lending land tenure arrangements (versus PA-allocated 
or owner cultivated tenure) are examined, using the stochastic production frontier 
approach and data from the ILRI survey. 
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5 Measurement of technical efficiency 
There are two common approaches in the literature for estimating technical efficiency. 
One approach is based on non-parametric, non-stochastic, and linear programming (data 
envelopment analysis). This suffers from the criticism that it takes no account of the 
possible influence of measurement error and other noise in the data (Coelli 1995). The 
second approach uses econometrics to estimate a stochastic frontier furiction, and 
estimate the inefficiency component of the error terni. The disadvantage of this 
approach is that it imposes an explicit and possibly restrictive functional foret on the 
technology. However, this approach is chosen here because it permits the estimation of 
the determinants of inefficiency of the producing unit, which is the main focus of this 
paper. 
Farrell (1957) suggested a deterministic method of meâsuring the technical efficiency 
of a firm in an industry by estimating a frontier production function. Several extensions 
of Farrell's model have been made, the most recent being the stochastic frontier models 
developed by Aigner, Lovel and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977), which have been used extensively (Coelli 1995). 
The stochastic frontier model assumes an error term with two additive components- 
asymmetric composent that accounts for pure random factors (v;), and a one-sided 
component, which captures the effects of inefficiency relative to the stochastic frontier 
(u;). The random factor (v) is independently and identically distributed with N(O,c 2) 
while the technical inefficiency effects, (u), is often assumed to have a half normal? 
distribution 1 N(0,6v2) j. The model is expressed as: 
Y. =x.p+(v; -u.) (1) 
TE =exp- u. =z3 (2) 
where x; is vector of input quantities of the i`h firm, zi is the vector of firm-specific factors 
determining inefficiency. The 3 and S are unknown parameters to be estimated together 
with the variance parameters expressed as 62 = C Y2 6 , and y = 6 , /(c + 6 ). The 
parameter, y, has a value between zero and one, such that the value of zero is associated 
with the traditional response furiction, for which the non-negative random variable, ui, is 
absent from the model. Technical efficiency is defined as TEi = exp(-u;). It is predicted 
using the conditional expectation of exp(-u;), given the composed error terra in equation 
1. In this specification, the parameters, (3, r, 6,,, 6 and y can be estimated by method of 
7. Although other assumptions about the distribution of the inefficiency effect (u) such as the truncated normal 
and exponential distributions are available, the half normal distribution has become a fairly standard choice 
for the one-sided distribution in the literature. An additional advantage of assuming half normal here is that 
it allows us to use FRONTIER program for estimating the parameters of the frontier functions and 
inefficiency effects. 
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maximum likelihood, using the computer program, FRONTIER Version 4.1 (Coelli 
1996). This computer program also computes estimates of efficiency. 
5.1 Empirical model 
Data on the sample of 477 plots in the land tenure survey in Arsi is used to estimate a 
Cobb-Douglas stochastic production frontier.$ A single equation model is justified, since 
input allocations and output are observed, implying the general input allocation case 
where technological relationships can be estimated directly without explicit assumptions 
that restrict either behaviour or technology (Just et al. 1983). 
5.2 Variables in the frontier production function 
Output of a plot depends in general on labour, traction, purchased inputs such as seed, 
fertiliser and pesticides, plot area, soil quality of the plot and the type of crop grown. In 
the estimation, including plot area in the model introduces severe multicollinearity as 
detected by variance inflation factor greater than 5. As such, plot output and inputs are 
normalised by plot area. The dependent variable in the model is the value of output of 
the plot per hectare including both grains and straw. 
Only labour for land preparation and crop establishment (establishment labour) and 
seeding, weeding, and fertiliser and pesticide application (seeding and weeding labour) 
are included in the model as explanatory variables. Labour used for harvesting, threshing 
and transport of produce is usually proportional to yield and should not affect the 
frontier. Hence, only animal traction input for land preparation is included. 
Purchased inputs including seed, fertiliser and pesticides are valued to compute total 
costs of inputs per hectare. It would be desirable to have différent coefficients (effects) 
for these individual inputs because they are very likely to have différent influences on 
crop production. However, there are significant proportions of the sample plots that 
have zero values for these inputs. 
In addition to the traditional inputs, plot productivity is influenced by the quality of 
the plot land. Due to its substantial variation, land quality is hypothesised to be an 
important determinant of output. We constructed the land quality measure as an index 
based on farmers' perceptions of the quality of their plots with respect to the extent to 
which i) soil infertility, ii) damage from animals, iii) damage from pests, rats and mice, 
and iv) water logging are problems. Soil infertility is the most frequent problem reported 
to be moderate or severe problem on more than one-third of the plots. Each of these 
problems was rated by farmers as either not a major problem, moderate or severe 
problem. A score of 1 to 3 was assigned to the severity of the problem i.e. 1 to severe 
8. A translog production frontier was attempted. However, the Cobb-Douglas fonction was preferred due to 
the severe multi-collinearity introduced by the interaction terms in the translog. 
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problem, 2 for moderate problem, and 3 when the problem is not a major one on the 
plot. The index for the ith plot relative to the score of best land is computed as: q; = 
E,s,/12 where s;; is the severity score of the jth problem on the ith plot. The score of land 
quality, theoretically, ranges from 0.33 (the worst quality) to 1 (best land) but the 
computed score ranges from 0.426 to 1. 
Farmers in this area grow a wide range of crops but the major crops include wheat, 
barley and horse beans. We hypothesise that the intercept of the production frontier is 
influenced by crop choice on the plot. The choice of the crop is categorised as wheat, 
barley, other cereals (including maize and teff), pulses (horse beans and field peas), and 
other crops mainly garden crops such as onion and garlic. The coefficients of the dummy 
variables (excluding wheat), therefore, compare the production frontier of barley, other 
cereals, pulses and other crops to that of wheat. 
Finally, the frontier model includes location dummies. The sample farmers were 
selected from four différent locations, namely Abichu, Bilalo, Ketar Genet and Mecro 
Chebote. Since some variations in altitude, common soil types, crop and livestock mix, 
and degree of landlessness may exist, we hypothesise that the frontier may shift by 
location. 
5.3 Variables in the technical efficiency model 
Beside the type of land contract, many household socio-economic and farm charac- 
teristics may affect the technical efficiency of the plot. To measure technical inefficiency 
of land tenures relative to land cultivated by owner, commonly known as PA-land, three 
dummy variables denoting the type of land contract (rental, sharing and borrowing) are 
included. According to our hypotheses about the effect of tenure contracts, we expect 
positive coefficients on rented, shared and gift plots. Beside whether the land tenure 
contracts are statistically différent from zero, it is necessary to test whether their 
respective coefficients are equal. These hypotheses can be tested using t-tests. 
Resource base of the household is hypothesised to affect technical efficiency through 
their effect on input use. The total land area cultivated, and the number of oxen owned 
by the household is introduced as the most important indicators of the household 
resource base. In addition, the ratio of household supplied hours in total labour use and 
the ratio of hours supplied by adult male labour in total labour use are included to test 
the relative efficiency of household labour and male labour since these factors may affect 
the unobserved quality of labour. Among the most important socio-economic variables 
in the technical efficiency model are age, sex and education of the head of the house- 
hold, wealth and ethnic group of the household. These variables are likely to influence 
farmer's perception and willingness to adopt new innovations as well as their effect on 
the unobserved labour quality and management skills and therefore may affect technical 
inefficiency. 
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6 Results and discussion 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the variables in the stochastic frontier (efficiency) and ineffi- 
ciency models are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Value of output per hectare averages 
Ethiopian Birr (EB) 2478 with the highest returns obtained on land cultivated by 
owners. Statistically, average returns from gift plots are significantly lower than those 
from owned and rented plots but average returns of share-cropped and gift plots are not 
significantly différent from each other. 
Table 2. Average value of output per hectare, input use per hectare and soil quality on plots with alternative land 








plots Gift plots Average 
No. of plots 295.0 74.0 44.0 63.0 476.0 
Value of output per hectare (EB/ha) 2546.35x' 2535.87'` 2439.12a" 2120.236 2478.42 
Establishment labour (hrs/ha) 112.32' 122.11' 110.29' 122.50' 115.0 
Seeding and weeding labour (hrs/ha) 117.83'' 58.756' 54.98b' 80.50ab 97.89 
Pre-harvest animal traction (hours) 226.74' 224.18' 226.01' 246.05' 231.94 
Input cost (EB/ha) 528.19' 450.24' 451.19' 461.15' 500.08 
Soil quality index 0.107' 0.107' 0.092' 0.094' 0.104 
Plots in wheat (%) 36.27 59.46 61.36 41.27 42.86 
Plots in barley (%) 29.49 25.68 15.91 28.57 27.52 
Plots in other cereals (%) 11.19 5.41 9.09 7.94 9.66 
Plots in pulses (%) 13.22 6.76 13.64 11.11 11.97 
Plots in other crops (%) 9.83 2.7 0 11.11 7.98 
Means superscripted by the saine letter along rows are not statistically different. Means superscripted by different letters 
are statistically different from each other at 5% level when superscript is followed by * and at 10% level when followed 
by -. Equality of means tests are irrelevant to trop distribution. 
Source: Authors' calculation from ILRI's land tenure survey in Arsi (1994). 
While there are no significant différences in labour use for crop establishment, plots 
under different land tenure arrangements receive significantly different quantities of 
labour for seeding and weeding, a period of high demand for labour. Rented and 
sharecropped plots receive less than half of the labour input on plots cultivated by 
owners during these operations. Animal traction averages 231.94 hours per hectare with 
no statistically significant différence between land tenure systems. 
Average cost of seed, inorganic fertiliser and herbicides is EB 500/ha with no sig- 
nificant différence between land tenure contracts. However, input cost on owner- 
cultivated plots is 17% higher than those on rented and sharecropped plots. This 
différence may be attributed to the varying crop requirements on these plots. Similarly, 
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there is no statistically significant différence in land quality between plots of différent 
contracts. Regardless of the tenure arrangement of the plot, wheat, a principal cereal 
crop in the area, is produced on most of the plots (36-61%). Rented and sharecropped 
plots are mainly allocated to wheat (Table 2). 
The age of the head of the household in the sample varies from 17 to 87 years and 
averaged 35.3 years (Table 3). Older farmers reflect longer farming experience but are 
likely to have received less formal education and tend to be conservative with respect to 
adoption of new technology. 
Table 3. Socio-economic characteristics of the study sample farmers in the 
highlands of Ethiopia. 
Variable 
Average age of the head of the household (years) 35.26 
Average family size (persons) 4.32 
Average dependency ration 0.55 
Average ratio of females in the household 0.36 
Average number of work oxen owned (oxen) 1.63 
Average cultivated area (ha) 1.55 
Gender distribution of household heads (%) 
Households with male heads 92.5 
Households with female heads 7.5 
Wealth status of the household (%) 
Poor 29.8 
Medium wealth 57.1 
Rich 13.0 
Education status of the head of the household (%) 
Illiterate 31.06 
Minimum literacy (ust read and write) 14.29 
Format education 54.65 
Primary occupation of the head of the household (%) 
Farmer 97.5 
Others 2.5 
Ethnic group of the head of household (%) 
Oromo 75.8 
Other ethnic groups 24.2 
a. Dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of dependents (age 
below 15 and above 60) to number of adults (age above 15 years and below 60). 
Source: Authors' calculation from ILRI's land tenure survey in Arsi (1994). 
Among the sample households, 31% are illiterate and 14.3% can read and write in 
some language with the majority of household heads (55%) having received a formal 
education of up to high school level. Almost 30% of the households can be classified as 
relatively poor based on their land and livestock resources and 13% are relatively rich. 
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The primary occupation of 97.5% of the heads of the households is farming with few 
traders, livestock herders and salary employment. About 76% of the heads of the 
households are Oromo, the principal ethnic group in this area. The test are mainly 
immigrant and as such tend to be landless. 
Plot sizes are small with average area of 0.37 ha. However, households usually control 
multiple plots with average farta holding of 1.55 ha. Livestock is an important enterprise 
in this farming system. Average holding of livestock is 6.67 TLUs of which 1.63 heads 
(1.35 TLUs) are draft oxen. 
It is fundamental that all explànatory variables in the model be exogenous to the 
production structure, so that none of the covariates in the second stage inefficiency 
analysis is correlated with the variables in the frontier model resulting in multi- 
collinearity or approximate linear relationship among some of the regressors (Kennedy 
1985). The inverse of the correlation matrix is often used in detecting multi-collinearity. 
The diagonal elements of this matrix are the variance inflation factors (VIF,) given by 
(1-RiZ)-1 where Ri' is the RZ from regressing the ith independent variable on all the 
other independent variables. A high VIF indicates an Rie near unity and hence suggests 
collinearity. As a rule of thumb, for standardised data a VIF; > 10 indicates harmful 
collinearity (Kennedy 1985). In this study, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
equation is estimated with all the independent variables used in the frontier production 
function and inefficiency model and their VIFiwere computed. Maximum VIF in this 
data set is 2.76 and most of the values are smaller than 2 (Appendix I). We concluded 
that multicollinearity is not a serious problem here. 
6.2 The stochastic frontier function 
The maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters in the stochastic frontier and 
inefficiency model are presented in Table 4. All the coefficients, with the exception of 
the type of crop cultivated and location-specific dummy variables, are interpreted as the 
elasticities of output value with respect to inputs. The elasticity of output with respect to 
purchased input (seed, fertiliser and pesticides) is highly significant with a value of 0.33. 
An additional investment of EB 1 in these inputs yields EB 0.63 in profit (EB 1.63 of 
revenues) at the mean output and purchased inputs. This represents high returns to 
application of purchased inputs in this system. One factor contributing to this high level 
of returns is probably the favourable climatic conditions, mainly rainfall, where pro- 
duction response to fertilisation and improved seed technology is expected to be high. 
The regression results support the hypothesis that the quality of the plot is an important 
determinant of the slope of the production frontier. The estimated elasticity with respect 
to land quality is 0.44. This indicates high returns to improving land quality. All the 
problems reducing the quality of land, as measured here, can be reversed through 
adoption of improved technologies such as inorganic fertiliser application, soil 
conservation and drainage. 
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Table 4. Maximum likelihood estimates of the stochastic production frontier and technical 
inefficiency modeL 
Variable Coefficient Estimate t-ratio 
Intercept Po 6.373 21.0798 
Purchased inputs' (Birr) lii 0.3255 8.643 
Land quality indexe (Birr) 92 0.4392 2.7512 
Crop establishment labour' (hrs) (33 0.0219 0.4142 
Seeding and weeding' (hrs) (34 0.0333 2.5627 
Pre-harvest animal traction (hrs)' Rs -0.0342 -0.9990 
Crop type (dummies) 
Other cereals (3 -0.3024 -4.4948 
Barley Rs -0.3829 -5.6603 
Pulses (39 -0.1235 -1.9511 
Other crops 1310 0.0544 0.6164 
Location dummies 
Abichu (dummy) Pli -0.1852 -3.4877 
Bilalo (dummy) Rie -0.0114 -0.1463 
K. Genet (dummy) 913 -0.2167 -2.1958 
a. Variables defined in natural logarithm. Dependent variable is log of value of output per hectare. 
While crop establishment labour is statistically jnsignificant, weeding and seeding 
labour is significantly différent from zero with a coefficient of 0.03. The coefficient of 
pre-harvesting animal traction is negative but is statistically insignificant. This is 
unexpected. However, animal labour for land preparation varies principally with the 
slope of the land. Steep plots require more time in ploughing, usually subject to water 
erosion and likely to be of lower productivity. As such, this variable may capture the 
negative effect of land slope on crop yields.9 
The production frontier of barley, pulses and other cereals differs significantly from that 
of wheat. The coefficients (intercept shifters) on these variables are negative and significant. 
This means the production frontier for these crops are distinctly below that of other crops. 
This result explains the dominance of wheat in the crop mix of farmers in this area. 
Although located in the same agro-ecological zone, the four locations of this study 
appear to differ significantly with respect to the intercept of the production frontier. The 
coefficients on two of the three location dummies are negative and statistically sig- 
nificantly différent from zero, i.e. the fourth location. 
6.3 Inefficiency effects 
The efficiency estimates of the sample range from as low as 4% to as high as 94% and 
averages 71%. The implication of this is quite significant as farmers can increase their 
9. Slope of the plot is not included in computing the land quality index presented earlier for lack of data. 
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crop incomes by as high as 40% on average, by improving their technical efficiency. The frequency distribution of the estimated efficiency is shown in Figure 1. One-quarter of the plots has an estimated efficiency of 0.6 or less while 50% of the plots have estimated 
efficiency of 0.7 or less. The estimated y (overall measure of inefficiency) is very high 
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Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of the estimated technical efficiency in the Ethiopian highlands. 
6.4 Efficiency effect of land tenure contracts 
Tenure status significantly influences technical efficiency (Table 5). Coefficients on the 
three dummy variables defining the types of land contract, i.e. fixed rental, share- 
cropping, and gift plots, are all positive, i.e. these tenure systems are less efficient 
compared to owner-cultivated plots. However, only the coefficients on sharecropping 
and gift plots are statistically significant and différent from zero (cultivating own land). 
Using t-tests, the hypotheses of the equality of the coefficients of fixed rental and share- 
cropping (H°: 81 = 82) and equality of the coefficients of sharecropped and gift plots (62 = 
83), cannot be rejected. This indicates that the levels of inefficiency associated with rental 
and sharecropping and that of sharecropping and gift plots are not statistically différent. 
However, the technical inefficiency effects of rent and gift plots are statistically different 
at 10% level of significance.10 Compared to owner-cultivated farm plots, therefore, 
10. The calculated values of the t-statistics for HO: S, S, and S, = S, are, respectively, -1.02, -0.654 and -1.846. 
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sharecropping and lending land tenure arrangement are less efficient. However, the 
degree of inefficiency varies as indicated by the magnitude of the coefficients. Rented 
plots, on the other hand, are not statistically différent in their inefficiency as compared 
to owner-cultivated plots. 
Table 5. Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of technical inefficiency model. 
Variable' Coefficients Estimates t-ratio 
Intercept So -4.7555 -1.2623 
Rented plot (dummy) S, 1.0088 1.564 
Share-cropped plot (dummy) Sz 2.4937 2.0179 
Gift plot (dummy) S3 4.0344 2.025 
Household head age (years) 54 -0.0871 -1.8944 
Household head sex (=1 if male) S5 0.9771 1.0842 
Education (=1 if illiterate) 56 1.9951 1.7681 
Education (=1 if minimum literacy) 57 -2.0318 -1.8582 
Ethnic group (=1 if Oromo) Ss -0.0489 -0.1575 
Principal occupation(= 1 if farmer) Ss 1.0884 0.9349 
Dependency ratio 510 0.6012 1.5121 
Women ratio S 0.6979 0.7571 
Wealth (=1 if poor) S12 -0.1317 -0.3095 
Land area cultivated (ha) S,3 0.6009 1.9837 
No. of oxen owned (number) S,4 -0.2056 -1.6883 
Ratio of household labour S15 4.4758 2.0382 
Ratio of men labour S16 -7.7808 -2.2509 
Sigma-square a2 3.1716 2.048 
Gama y 0.9697 66.7936 
Log likelihood function L -318.7621 
1. Dependent variable is technical inefficiency measure determined in a single stage procedure and 
estimated using FRONTIER 4.1. 
Figure 2 compares the cumulative distribution of technical efficiency associated with 
the différent types of land tenure. More than one-half of the farmers cultivating their 
own plots operate above the estimated average efficiency level compared to less than 
one-quarter cultivating borrowed plots. Average technical efficiency of both owner- 
cultivated and rented plots is very similar, 0.73, compared to 0.67 for sharecropped plots 
and 0.64 for gift plots. On average, technical efficiency of owner-cultivated and rented 
plots is 10 and 15% higher than sharecropping and borrowed plots, respectively. 
The différent levels of inefficiency associated with the land tenure systems can be 
explained by the relative degree of restrictions involved and interaction of labour and 
input markets. Fixed rent plots have the least restrictions, with respect to the rights of 
the tenant, and do not involve labour or input exchange. Thus, since the fixed renter or 
tenant pays for all inputs and, subsequently, reaps all benefits (or losses) of his or her 
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Figure 2. Cumulative distribution of the estimated efficiency of owner-cultivated plots as compared to alternative land 
tenure arrangements in the Ethiopian highlands. 
cropping activities with the least restrictions on his input-output decisions, fixed rent 
contracts are not associated with significant inefficiency. The tenter is the residual 
claimant to output and so fixed rental tenancy results in resource allocation and 
technical efficiency that is equal to owner cultivated plots. Sharecropping, on the other 
hand, involves a commitment by both partners to share the costs of inputs and benefits 
of outputs, but considerable restrictions on rights of the sharecropper. Moreover, the 
tenant is required to provide labour input to the landowner, so that substantial delays in 
performing critical field operations and sub-optimal use of labour on tenant's fields may 
occur. Therefore, despite the contribution of the landowner, in terms of inputs, Jack of 
autonomy on the part of the tenant in this partnership explains the inefficiency of 
sharecropping. Similar labour constraints and Jack of timeliness of performing field 
activities may also explain the relative inefficiency of borrowed plots. 
Despite their relative inefficiency, however, sharecropping and gifting are still 
common types of land transactions in Ethiopia. One explanation for this is the growing 
landlessness in rural areas due to population pressure and limited alternative livelihood 
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opportunities. This may give landowners an advantage in negotiating land contracta." 
Other motives include resource and risk pooling. Since the implicit cost of share- 
cropping is 40% of that of fixed rent paid after harvest, sharecropping may be motivated 
by inability of the tenant to pay advanced (i.e. before planting or harvesting) fixed rent, 
given the absence of credit market. 
6.5 Other determinants of inefficiency 
Besides land tenure systems, several socio-economic and resource factors have significant 
influence on technical inefficiency (Table 5). The negative coefficient of age indicates 
that technical inefficiency appears to be lower among older farmers. Age here captures 
farming experience, which may accumulate over time as a result of learning by doing. 
Thus, an older farmer may become more proficient with his technology as he accumu- 
lates information (Feder et al. 1985). 
The relative efficiency of family labour is not readily apparent. High proportion of 
family labour in total labour may reduce technical efficiency as indicated by the positive 
and statistically significant coefficient. Households obtain labour from neighbours and 
the community in exchange arrangements while wage labour hiring in farming is limited. 
High levels of proportion of family labour involvement may indicate that the household 
faces a tight labour constraint, possibly leading to unobserved effort or binding con- 
straint at a critical demand periods, thus resulting in technical inefficiency. 
Technical inefficiency decreases with an increase in the number of oxen owned by 
the household. Clearly, households with more oxen are able to carry out land 
preparation operations timely and attract more non-farm labour through exchange of 
oxen. Compared to heads of households with formai education, illiterate farmers are 
more inefficient. However, farmers who are able to read and write with no formal 
education are more efficient than those with formal education. Apparently, the ability to 
write and read may be sufficient in the context of improving technical inefficiency of 
farming. This result is consistent with the theory of adoption of innovation as education 
enhances technology uptake and perhaps the returns to adoption. 
Relatively smaller farm size reduces inefficiency, as indicated by the positive and 
significant coefficient on land area cultivated. This may be due to low levels of resources 
and technology that allow efficient operations. This inverse farm-size relationship is 
consistent with the literature. This may be because unobserved aspects of land quality 
are lower for households with more land especially where land redistribution have tried 
to balance land quality and availability to the households. This may be also because of 
unmeasured inputs such as quality of labour and management effort. There may also be 
diseconomies of scale as implied by the sum of the coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas 
function (Table 4). 
Women ratio in the household has no significant impact on technical efficiency. 
Apparently, women ratio does not affect labour supply to farming especially during the 
periods of high demand for women labour such as weeding, harvesting and threshing. 
However, the higher the proportion of men labour, the higher the technical efficiency 
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on the plot, relative to child and women labour. The other variables, wealth, sex and 
principal occupation of the household head, dependency ratio and ethnicity, have no 
statistical impact on reducing inefficiency. 
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7 Conclusion 
As a result of the high population pressure, land scarcity is becoming pervasive and the 
degree of landlessness is increasing among the rural population of the highlands of 
Ethiopia. Due to limited availability of alternative employment opportunities, access to 
land and functioning of land market is becoming an increasingly critical policy issue. As 
elements of the traditional systems of land tenure and evolving land market institutions 
are re-emerging, analysis of the technical efficiency of alternative land tenure systems is 
essential for land policy formulation by identifying policies that facilitate the more 
efficient transactions. Moreover, the issue of the impact of land tenure systems on 
agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa is still unresolved despite the attention it 
received from development economists. 
This paper analyses the technical efficiency of plots cultivated under the dominant 
land tenure systems in the highlands of Ethiopia. The analysis implicitly captures the 
interaction of other markets as these land tenure systems involve varying degrees of 
interaction with labour, input, credit and insurance markets. For example, share- 
cropping involves advanced credit to the tenant in form of deferred rent payment and 
input in exchange for predetermined proportion of output but also labour. Similarly, 
labour supply is an implicit part of land gift agreement, i.e. labour wages paid in form of 
implicit rent by owner of the land. The econometric results indicate that land 
transactions such as sharecropping and land gift that involved restrictions on tenant's 
decision making are technically inefficient compared to owner-cultivated or fixed rental 
tenures. 
These results imply that public policies that facilitate efficient functioning of the 
inter-related markets and that help create alternative employment opportunities to 
reduce pressure on agricultural land can help increase technical efficiency. If, for 
examplé, the main motive for sharecropping is risk pooling and that missing credit 
markets discourage fixed rentals, functioning of credit and insurance markets may 
encourage fixed rentals. Alternative wage employment opportunities may raise farm 
labour productivity and encourage wage labour. The conclusion from this study 
compares to others in Asia, where sharecropping is often a `second best efficient' in 
situations of imperfect or missing factor markets. The implication of this is that banning 
sharecropping, as has been the case during the Derg regime, with or without a private 
market for land, may lower efficiency in the presence of failure of credit, labour and 
oxen markets. 
Some caveat worth mentioning. First, this analysis used a cross sectional data from 
one region in Ethiopia. Although land tenure systems are fairly similar in the country, 
some regional différences may exist. Second, the quantitative analysis made some explicit 
assumption about the distribution of inefficiency to facilitate the use of the FRONTIER 
methodology. The statistical issues of testing the validity of this assumption may need to 
be addressed in future research. 
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Appendix 1. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimates of coefficients and collinearity 
statistics of variables in the production 
frontier and inefficiency model 
Coefficient Collinearity statistics 
estimates t-stat Tolerance VIF* 
Intercept 5.644 11.699 
Purchased inputs' (Birr) 0.338 8.044 0.723 1.384 
Land quality index' (Birr) 0.674 3.285 0.826 1.211 
Crop establishment labour' (hrs) 0.067 1.144 0.583 1.716 
Seeding and weeding' (hrs) 0.041 2.706 0.711 1.407 
Pre-harvest animal traction (hrs)' 0.028 0.704 0.362 2.759 
Other cereals 0.008 0.081 0.616 1.622 
Barley 0.196 -3.138 0.742 1.348 
Pulses 0.112 -1.178 0.609 1.642 
Other crops 0.37 -3.132 0.563 1.777 
Abichu (dummy) 0.388 -4.739 0.438 2.283 
Bilalo (dummy) 0.423 -4.956 0.44 2.27 
K. Genet (dummy) 0.14 -1.688 0.505 1.98 
Rented plot (dummy) 0.105 -1.321 0.692 1.446 
Share-cropped plot (dummy) 0.183 -1.952 0.785 1.273 
Gift plot (dummy) 0.25 -2.649 0.564 1.774 
Household head age (years) 0.004 1.608 0.446 2.242 
Household head sex (=1 if male) 0.121 -1.142 0.752 1.329 
Education (=1 if illiterate) 0.143 -1.752 0.396 2.523 
Education (=1 if minimum literacy) 0.048 0.547 0.57 1.753 
Ethnic group (=1 if Oromo) 0.014 0.196 0.657 1.523 
Principal occupation (=1 if farmer) 0.143 0.688 0.921 1.086 
Dependency ratio 0.056 0.999 0.639 1.565 
Women ratio 0.13 0.941 0.6 1.666 
Wealth (=1 if poor) 0.056 0.656 0.558 1.791 
Land area cultivated (ha) 0.024 -1.031 0.423 2.363 
No. of oxen owned (number) 0.012 0.629 0.427 2.341 
Ratio of household labour 0.096 0.748 0.549 1.82 
Ratio of men labour 0.276 1.078 0.635 1.575 
*VIF = Variance Inflation Factor. 
a. Variables defined as natural log. The dependent variable is log of output value per hectare (Birr). 
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